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durng the past decade, reference to chna n the financal and academc press has lauded ts growth performance but tended to emphasse ts exchange rate regme and ts controversal current account surpluses wth the Unted states and the european Unon (see, for example, Tung and Baker 2004; Bernanke 2006; lardy 2006; mcknnon 2006; Xao 2006; callan 2007; Woo and Xao 2007; Tyers et al. 2008) . After the downturn n the Us housng market n 2007, however, and the assocated credt squeeze n the Unted states and europe, attenton shfted to the 'decouplng' ssue: whether chna's comparatvely rapd expanson could be sustaned n the face of slow-downs n organsaton for economc cooperaton and development (oecd) countres.
1 It appeared that the credt squeeze would brng the oft-antcpated 'hard correcton' to the mbalance consttuted by the extraordnarly large Us current account defict and that the Us dollar would snk, even relatve to the renmnb (rmB) (edwards 2005; obstfeld and rogoff 2005; roubn and setser 2005; echengreen 2006; krugman 2007) . how would ths affect chna's economc performance?
Wth exports amountng to almost half of ts GdP and most of these drected to europe and north Amerca, chna can expect that negatve financal shocks n those regons mght retard ts growth.
2 snce chna assembles manufactured components from elsewhere n Asa and the Pacfc, 3 the extent of ts 'decouplng' s the key to wder regonal performance. In the short term, one mtgatng factor s the transtory flght of ncreased amounts of the world's savngs nto chnese nvestment (mckbbn and stoeckel 2007b). The chnese government mght, however, oppose ths on volatlty grounds, va the strengthenng of nward captal controls; yet even f the addtonal financal captal s kept out of chna, mtgaton remans possble snce substantal real exchange rate realgnments are lkely and these could advantage chna n the short term. In the long run, a rsng consumpton share (lardy 2006; kujs 2006; kujs and he 2007; Azzz and cu 2007) and the redrecton of nvestment wthn chna to ts servces sector, where consderable potental remans for a productvty catch-up (ma 2006), wll underpn chna's growth.
In ths chapter, these ssues are explored collectvely usng a dynamc model of the global economy. The model smulates the real effects of shocks that take the form of transtory rses n regon-specfic nterest premums n north Amerca and Western europe, combned wth ncreases n nvestment financng costs n both regons. The key effects of these shocks are for the real net rates of return on north Amercan and Western european nvestment to fall whle the yelds demanded by financers ncrease. Investment falls n those regons and real wage rgdty ensure that unemployment rses, GdP growth slows and mport demand falls n both regons-at least temporarly. The focus of the analyss s, then, on factors nfluencng chna's growth performance n the face of these shocks. These lnked stores gnore, however, the consderable role of the surge n the growth of the 'emergng economes', and partcularly chna, snce the late 1990s, and the smultaneous yet ndependent nformaton technology (IT) related boom n Us productvty. The growth surge n emergng economes mproved the Us terms of trade n ths perod, rasng Us mports and ncreasng domestc prce competton.
The genesis of the North American and European slow-down
5 Its effect on the Us prce level can be nferred from the declne n the chnese blateral real exchange rate wth the Unted states, shown n Fgure 3.2. Whle Us producer prces showed a rsng trend durng 2000-05, the Us dollar prces of an ever-expandng supply of chnese goods were fallng. The deflatonary force yelded was bolstered by the ITrelated Us productvty boom, whch began n the early 1990s and contnued through to 2006 (Table 3 .1).
6 Along wth the negatve shocks assocated wth the Us stock-market correcton and the 11 september 2001 terrorst attacks, the collectve deflatonary force was consderable, justfyng the observed monetary easng on nflaton targetng grounds alone. even wth ths monetary expanson, a temporary deflatonary effect s seen clearly n Fgure 3.2 from the declne n the Us producer prce durng 2001. of course, the concdence of Us asset prce nflaton wth product prce deflaton was bound to create a crss of prorty n 2000-03. Wth asset prce targetng always controversal, t s not surprsng that the Federal reserve gave prorty to the control of product prce deflaton, thus keepng annual consumer prce ndex (cPI) changes n the postve range (Fgure 3.3).
later n the perod, the transtonal economes' growth surge caused a global commodty prce boom, wth ol prces reachng unprecedented hghs (Fgure 3.4), followed not long after by prce spkes n other commodtes (Fgure 3.5).
7 Ths tended to reverse the product prce deflatonary pressure n the Unted states and to justfy the restoraton of the Us federal fund rate to more normal levels durng 2004-06 (Fgure 3.1). At the same tme, however, t exacerbated Us asset prce nflaton as ol-exportng countres joned the other transtonal economes n buldng up Us dollar-denomnated reserve assets. 8 The financal contracton n 2007 was therefore a consequence of more complex forces to whch the relatve expanson of the chnese economy was a contrbutor. nonetheless, the contracton orgnated n the Unted states and spread to varyng degrees to other oecd countres and, partcularly, to Western europe. Whle Fgure 3.1 shows that the easng by the Federal reserve durng 2007-08, n response to the credt contracton, reduced long and short government borrowng rates, anecdotal evdence confirms that refinancng rates for prvate firms ncreased substantally as rsk was reprced (see, for example, Brownng and slver 2008). our purpose s to examne the drect and 
The model
We use a mult-regon, mult-product dynamc smulaton model of the world economy, whch s an adaptaton of the model constructed by Tyers and sh (2007) and extended for macroeconomc applcatons by Tyers and Ban (2007) and Golley (2008a, 2008b) . 9 only real shocks and ther effects are represented. 10 In the verson used, the world s subdvded nto 14 regons (Table 3 .2). Industres are aggregated nto three sectors: agrculture (ncludng processed foods), ndustry (mnng, energy and manufacturng) and servces (ncludng constructon)-the last beng lttle traded n comparson wth the other two. Falures of the law of one prce for traded goods are represented by product dfferentaton, so that consumers substtute mperfectly between products from dfferent regons. There are two endogenous sources of smulated economc growth-namely, physcal captal accumulaton and the transformaton of labour from unsklled to sklled. Techncal change s ntroduced n the form of exogenous productvty growth that s sector and factor specfic, allowng productvty performance to dffer between factors and between tradable and non-tradable sectors.
11 regonal captal accounts are open so that regonal households hold portfolos of assets that are clams over home and foregn captal. Investors n regon i have adaptve expectatons about real net rates of return, r i c , the determnants of whch mght be summarsed smply as 
n whch P i Y s the regon's GdP prce, P i K s the prce of captal goods (a separate ndustry defined n the model) and δ i s the deprecaton rate. Gven ths rate of return, the determnaton of nvestment n each regon s complex, but for our purpose t can be charactersed smply as follows. 12 It s drven postvely by the real net rate of return, r i c , and negatvely by the rate that must be returned to savers, or the financng cost, r i . Therefore 
n whch Y i s regonal ncome. lagged adjustment processes embedded n the I(r i c , r i ) ensure that financal captal s not sufficently moble nternatonally to equate r i c and r i n the short term, but that ther paths converge n the long term unless exogenous shocks prevent ths. General financal reform s represented by a dmnuton of the nterest premum, π i , whch n chna's case tends to rase ts share of global funds for nvestment through tme. 13 chna's average savng rate s hgh ntally, declnng through tme as ts populaton ages. The baselne smulaton therefore mantans a chnese current account surplus that dmnshes after 2010.
A demographc component of the model tracks populatons n four age groups, both genders and two skll categores: a total of 16 populaton groups n each of the 14 regons. The skll subdvson s between producton labour (unsklled) and professonal labour (sklled).
14 each age-gender-skll group s represented as a homogeneous sub-populaton wth a group-specfic brth and death rate, labour force partcpaton rate and rates of mmgraton and emgraton. Because the non-traded servces sector s relatvely skll ntensve n all regons, trends n skll composton prove to be partcularly mportant for the algnment of real exchange rates. These depend on the rate at whch each
regon's educaton and socal development nsttutons transform unsklled (producton-worker) famles nto sklled (professonal-worker) famles. each year, a partcular proporton of the populaton n producton-worker age-gender groups s transferred to professonal status. The ntal values of these proportons depend on the regons' levels of development, the assocated capactes of ther educaton systems and the relatve szes of ther producton and professonal labour forces. rates of transformaton change through tme n response to correspondng changes n real per capta ncome and the sklled wage premum.
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The 16 age-gender-skll groups dffer n ther shares of regonal dsposable ncome, consumpton preferences, savng rates and labour force partcpaton behavour. Whle the consumpton-savngs choce s parametersed dfferently between groups, t s dependent for all on group-specfic real per capta dsposable ncome and the regonal real lendng rate. Governments are assumed to balance ther budgets whle savng and borrowng are undertaken by the prvate sector. The baselne scenaro s a 'busness-as-usual' projecton of the global economy to 2030, wth 1997 as the base year. For valdaton experments through 1997-2006, see Tyers and Golley (2008a) .
Simulating the North American and Western European slow-down
We compare a baselne busness-as-usual smulaton to 2030, n whch the chnese economy contnues to grow strongly, 16 wth one n whch a financal contracton retards performance n north Amerca and the european Unon. We focus n ths secton on the charactersaton of the downturn n those regons. The analyss s n no way a forecastng exercse; rather, t s to establsh a representatve pathway for the nternatonal economy on whch we can supermpose some alternatve chnese polcy responses. recallng that nvestors n our model are represented as havng adaptve expectatons, we have not attempted to use t to construct a precse repetton of the events leadng up to the Us housng bubble and the bubble tself, snce the latter arose from ll-formed expectatons about future market performance, at least by some nvestors. rather, we mpose exogenous shocks that combne to represent the real effects of the resultng credt squeeze.
The shocks we use are all transtory, peakng n 2008 wth a recovery n the subsequent five years. They apply to the two regons, 'north Amerca' and 'Western europe', and are weaker n the latter. The first s a rse n the nvestment nterest premums, π i , over other regons of the world. Ths reflects the recent ncrease n gross returns requred by nvestors n these regons to compensate for perceved ncreases n rsk. The effect of ths shock s to rase the financng cost of nvestment n north Amerca and Western europe. second, the productvty of nvestment n these regons s reduced through shocks to the technologes used n ther captal-goods sectors. Ths s an ndrect means of reflectng the recent declnes n rates of return on nstalled captal, r i c , n both regons. 17 In effect, ths serves to wden the ntermedaton wedge between margnal nvestor earnngs and financng costs.
snce the pathway to be smulated has only to be 'representatve', and snce clear data on oecd nvestment credt costs through 2007 are not yet avalable, the scale of these shocks s arbtrary. For north Amerca, we rase the nvestment nterest premum by 2 percentage ponts and captal-goods productvty s reduced by 5 per cent. The correspondng shocks for Western europe are half the sze of those for north Amerca. All shocked varables then return to baselne benchmarks lnearly durng a recovery perod of five years. The effects these shocks have on nvestment financng rates on the one hand and real rates of return on the other are llustrated n Fgures 3.6 and 3.7, whch show percentage departures from a baselne smulaton n whch all regons grow smoothly. note that the global captal market clearng nterest rate, r w , reduces by 0.9 percentage ponts because of the contracton n nvestment demand n north Amerca and europe. The short-run effect on the domestc financng rate n north Amerca s therefore a rse of 1.1 percentage ponts, whle the correspondng net rse n Western europe s just 0.1 percentage ponts.
The wedge between financng costs and the real rate of return s clear from the figures, whch also show that the model's nvestment dynamcs lead to some overshootng of rates late n the recovery perod for north Amerca and Western europe.
18 Ths occurs because the shocks curtal north Amercan and european nvestment sharply n 2008 but rase nvestment n other regons, as shown n Fgure 3.8. durng the recovery, however, nvestment n north Amerca and Western europe expands quckly towards ther benchmark levels. The 2008 collapse n north Amercan and european nvestment, however, leaves these regons wth captal stocks below baselne levels for many years, the pace of ther recoveres notwthstandng. For ths reason, real rates of return n these regons rse above baselne levels on the pont of recovery and for some years beyond. For Western europe, the ntal shocks are smaller and ther effects are muted by the larger north Amercan shocks, whch tend to lower financng costs for the rest of the world, ncludng Western europe. 
Effects on economic performance
The effects on economc actvty n north Amerca, Western europe and chna are ndcated n Fgure 3.9, whch shows percentage departures from baselne GdP levels. The loss of output n north Amerca and Western europe s qute sgnficant, though t must be clear that the chart measures the extent of ther fallng behnd the baselne. There s no full year of negatve growth n ether north Amerca or Western europe, just a slow-down n both. 19 The extent of ther fallng behnd s made larger by the adopton of labour market closures n both shocked regons that mantan the path of real producton wages at the baselne level and so cause unemployment. At ts peak, 6 per cent of north Amerca's and 2 per cent of europe's producton labour force are rendered unemployed. 20 due to the flght of nvestment from north Amerca and Western europe, ndcated n Fgure 3.8, there s a surge n nvestment n chna, leadng to yet hgher growth there n the short run. snce chna already nvests almost half of ts GdP, ts capacty to absorb these addtonal funds could be questoned. For ths reason, we explore alternatve chnese scenaros n the next secton.
Turnng to effects on balances of payment, the north Amercan current account defict s large by ndustral-country standards, although the baselne China scenaro has t followng a declnng trend. 21 Western europe as a whole exhbts a current account surplus that s smaller n magntude than the north Amercan defict, whle chna's current account surplus s of extraordnary magntude, exceedng one-tenth of ts GdP, drven by ts very hgh savng rate and the resultng surplus of savng over nvestment. 22 In the baselne projecton, ths surplus s projected to declne as chna's average savng rate falls due to the ageng of ts populaton. After the financal shocks n north Amerca and Western europe and the resultng flght of nvestment from those regons, there are very large changes n the balances of payment n these regons. As smulated at least, the Us current account defict s temporarly reversed.
The surge n chna's nvestment after the flght from north Amerca and Western europe greatly dmnshes ts current account surplus-however, agan temporarly. Ths change n financal captal movements cushons the effects on chna of declnng mports n north Amerca and Western europe. Whle chna's exports take a ht, the closng financal captal mbalance and the assocated boost n chna's GdP (Fgure 3.9) ensures that mport growth s more than sustaned (Fgure 3.10). For chna's other tradng partners, therefore, and partcularly for those supplyng t wth raw materals and manufacturng components, the loss of markets n north Amerca and europe s cushoned by a chnese market that s expandng rather than contractng.
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The short-run substtuton of nvestment for exports n contrbutng to chna's GdP requres some dfficult structural adjustment n response to relatve prce changes. The nvestment generates a surge n domestc demand that rases the prces of chnese products and servces relatve to those n north Amerca. It therefore apprecates chna's real exchange rate relatve to north Amerca. 24 The smulated extent of ths s shown n Fgure 3.11 to be 10 per cent durng 2008. If monetary polcy s to emphasse the control of nflaton n chna, ths foreshadows a further 10 per cent apprecaton of the renmnb relatve to the Us dollar n just one year. 25 otherwse, the rate of nflaton must be allowed to accelerate. After four years, however, the path of chna's real exchange rate aganst north Amerca falls below the baselne path. Ths s because captal accumulaton accelerates n chna n the early years after the shock and decelerates n north Amerca. captal costs, and therefore prces, are lower n chna n the long run relatve to north Amerca. The same pattern s followed by chna's real effectve exchange rate, except that n the short run chna deprecates aganst some of ts other tradng partners, so that ts short-run real effectve apprecaton s only small, as shown n Fgure 3.12. Alternative Chinese policy scenarios our standard financal shock scenaro mght be thought to be optmstc from the perspectve of the chnese economy and ts regonal tradng partners. Ths s for two reasons. Frst, t assumes that chna s avalable to absorb addtonal nvestment, when t s already nvestng 45 per cent of ts GdP annually and t s arguably already captal heavy. 26 moreover, the chnese government mght regard the surge of financal nflows as footloose and therefore rsky. second, as seen n the prevous secton, the surge of funds leavng north Amerca and Western europe must nevtably drve up chna's real exchange rate, causng ether faster nflaton or more rapd nomnal apprecaton. nether of these developments wll be palatable to the chnese government. It mght therefore choose a polcy response that ether retards the nflow of new nvestment (tghter controls on ncomng financal captal) or matches the nflow wth ncreased outflows n the form of reserve accumulaton, for whch the savng rate would need to be, albet temporarly, further ncreased. These alternatve polcy responses foreshadow two new scenaros to be modelled.
Tghter captal controls that prevent the nvestment surge chna already mantans effectve controls over the nflow and the outflow of financal captal (see ma and mccauley 2007). legal nflows are prmarly foregn drect nvestment (FdI), but they nclude some purchases of domestc assets, ncludng 'B' shares on the shangha and shenzhen exchanges. Illegal nflows have evdently ncreased n recent years as yelds have rsen n chna relatve to the Unted states and as the renmnb has been allowed to apprecate aganst the Us dollar. 27 Illegal nflows notwthstandng, outflows of financal captal are substantally larger n chna than nflows and they have manly taken the form of offical foregn reserve accumulaton. The surplus of chna's savng over ts nvestment s, by definton, equvalent to the surplus of ts exports, generally defined, over ts mports. denomnated n foregn currences, ths surplus ends up n the hands of the People's Bank of chna (PBc), snce outward captal controls do not permt substantal foregn asset holdngs by prvate ndvduals. In recent years, there has been some relaxaton of controls n both drectons but the PBc stll finds t necessary to acqure foregn reserves n very large volumes each year. The recent surge of llegal nflows has, however, tended to restran the magntude of chna's net captal account poston, apprecatng the real exchange rate. The result has been both accelerated nflaton and upward flexblty of the renmnb durng 2006-07 (Tyers and Ban 2007 ).
here we assume that the chnese government opposes the nflow of addtonal financal captal on the grounds that t s volatle and therefore rsky and that t accelerates nflaton. 28 The polcy response s to tghten ts nward captal controls so as to prevent any surge-mantanng the baselne path of chna's captal account flows. compared wth the orgnal (reference) financal shock scenaro, ths causes the domestc real nterest rate to rse by almost 1 percentage pont, though t eventually rejons the baselne path. The smulated consequences of ths are summarsed for chna n Fgure 3.13; most mportant among them are the absence of a sgnficant surge n chnese nvestment (5 per cent compared wth the 27 per cent ndcated n Fgure 3.8) and hence a much reduced ncrease n chna's GdP (whch peaks at about 1 per cent, compared wth the 4 per cent n Fgure 3.9) and mports (whch peak at 1 per cent but fall below the baselne path thereafter, compared wth the peak of 10 per cent n Fgure 3.10).
Gross natonal product falls temporarly, mostly because chna holds a substantal stock of foregn assets, the rate of return on whch falls, as ndcated n Fgures 3.6 and 3.7.
29 Ths fall asde, n ths experment, we deny the chnese economy the postve aspect of the shock: the ncreased nvestment. The prevalng logc would suggest that there would therefore be no compensaton for the loss of exports to north Amerca and Western europe and hence that chna's growth rate would fall measurably. The smulaton shows, however, lttle mparment of chna's economc performance. nor s there any sgnficant reducton n chna's mports, whch support many of ts neghbourng economes. The resoluton of ths puzzle requres a return to the effects on the global captal market. There s a flght of savng from north Amerca and Western europe. In ths experment, t cannot go to chna, so t rases nvestment n other (mostly developng) regons. In the short run, these nvestment surges cause real apprecatons relatve to north Amerca and Western europe, 30 and, sgnficantly, snce chna does not partcpate, real apprecatons aganst chna.
Australa, for example-a key suppler of raw materals to chna-suffers a short-run real apprecaton of 15 per cent aganst north Amerca and 9 per cent aganst chna. As shown n Fgure 3.14, even though chna has a real apprecaton aganst north Amerca n the short run, ts real effectve exchange rate deprecates. Ths means that chna becomes more compettve n other markets as a consequence of the financal shocks and that ths s sufficent to allow t to weather the contracton n north Amercan and Western european mports. overall, then, apart from a dp n foregn-sourced ncome, ths scenaro s neutral from chna's standpont. It mantans chna's baselne growth path whle nsulatng aganst any volatlty that would stem from the temporary nflux of global savng. Also, from the vewpont of chna's neghbours supplyng t wth raw materals and components, ths scenaro s neutral, wth no dsturbance to the path of chna's mports. Its downsde rsk les n the comparatve tghtness that s requred n ts domestc captal market. Asde from the problems of overcomng the resultng ncreased ncentve for llegal financal nflows, ths could place at ncreased rsk debt-financed nvestments wthn chna and therefore rase the potental for the global financal meltdown to mgrate there.
Accelerated reserve accumulaton (ncreased savng)
In ths scenaro, the chnese government's nward captal controls are assumed to be neffectve n preventng the nvestment surge. The government s, however, able to rase the overall savng rate sufficently to offset any net effect on the balance of payments. one possble mechansm could be through tghter fiscal polcy, yeldng ncreased fiscal surpluses that supplement gross savng. As n the past, the thus-expanded surplus of savng over nvestment would be mopped up by the PBc through the sale of 'sterlsaton bonds'. The ncreased stock of these labltes would then balance the addtonal foregn reserves that stem from the correspondng surplus of broadly defined export earnngs over mport costs, denomnated n foregn currency. 31 The partcular assumpton we make s that the path of chna's captal account balance remans exactly as n the baselne scenaro. The nvestment shock s balanced precsely by an ncrease n total chnese savng, so that external flows ncrease n both drectons durng 2008, nettng out at baselne levels.
The results tell us, first, that ths scenaro would be mpossble to acheve n practce f the financal shock s as large as that smulated, snce a sudden and prodgous ncrease n the gross natonal savng rate-from 50 per cent to 72 per cent-would be requred to completely neutralse the nvestment surge. nonetheless, some blend of ths scenaro wth the prevous one s possble, so we persst wth our descrpton of ts consequences. The key effects on the chnese economy, measured as departures from the orgnal baselne scenaro, are ndcated n Fgure 3.15. The ncreases n nvestment and n savng n ths scenaro make the economc mplcatons larger than the captal controls scenaro consdered prevously, n whch the prncpal effects were external, due to real exchange rate realgnments. Because the rse n the savng rate robs the economy of consumpton expendture, however, the addtonal nvestment does 
Bilateral real rate vs North America
Real effective rate not rase GdP any further. The short-run fall n GnP, due to reduced returns on foregn assets, s also of a smlar order. What s dfferent about ths scenaro s that chna's exports rse temporarly (by one-fifth, compared wth no change under tghter captal controls) and ts mports fall, by about one-tenth (agan, compared wth no change under tghter captal controls).
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Agan, real exchange rate realgnments are decsve here, as suggested by Fgure 3.16. comparng ths figure wth Fgure 3.14, the short-run real apprecaton aganst north Amerca s a mere 2 per cent (compared wth almost 7 per cent n the captal controls scenaro) and the real effectve deprecaton s much larger (6 per cent compared wth 2 per cent). Imports are very much more expensve n chna under ths scenaro and so declne n the short run. As before, other regons absorb new nvestment after the flght of savng from the oecd countres and ths apprecates ther real exchange rates relatve to north Amerca. In chna's case, however, whle the new nvestment s also accommodated, the real exchange rate apprecates much less because domestc aggregate demand s sapped by the temporary ncrease n savng and the accelerated accumulaton of foregn reserves. overall, a temporary dp n foregn-sourced ncome and a substantal contracton n consumpton should make ths scenaro unpalatable to the chnese government. As for the manly Asan and Pacfic supplers of chna's raw materals and manufactured components, a temporary fall n the sze of chna's market s offset by ncreased nvestment.
Conclusion
consderng that exports make up almost half of chna's GdP and most of these are drected to europe and north Amerca, negatve financal shocks n those regons mght be expected to retard chna's growth. To confirm ths quanttatvely, shocks that wden the financal ntermedaton wedge are appled to north Amerca and Western europe n the context of a dynamc model of the global economy. contrary to expectaton, mtgatng factors are also set n tran by these shocks that lead to compensatng benefits for chna that nsulate ts economy, preservng ts comparatvely rapd growth path. These mtgatng factors take the form of the temporary flght of savngs from oecd countres nto chnese nvestment and real exchange rate realgnments.
The mtgatng factors are so strong that, as long as chna receves a far share of ncremental nvestment due to the flght of oecd savng, t wll be a net beneficary of financal shocks n north Amerca and Western europe-at least as measured by ts GdP. There are, however, good reasons why the chnese government mght seek to moderate the effects of ths nvestment surge, through tghter nward captal controls, or offset them wth ncreased reserve accumulaton. It mght, for example, vew these addtonal funds as footloose portfolo captal that could be wthdrawn suddenly n the future and therefore ncrease financal rsk at the natonal level. And whatever form the nflow were to take, t would rase chna's domestc aggregate demand and therefore apprecate ts real exchange rate, placng pressure on ts central bank to ether apprecate the renmnb more quckly or allow faster nflaton.
The results show that tghter captal controls could elmnate the nvestment surge but that ths would cause other regons' real exchange rates to apprecate relatve to chna, makng exports more compettve and trade dversficaton easer. If the chnese government were, nstead, to allow the nvestment boom to take place but to rase the home savng rate so as to offset t wth yet faster reserve accumulaton, the real deprecaton of chna relatve to ts other tradng partners would be even larger. Although ts mport growth would slow temporarly, ts GdP would mantan ts orgnal growth path, and, whle ts supplers of raw materals and manufacturng components would temporarly export less to chna, they would also enjoy ncreased nvestment sufficent to mantan ther own levels of economc actvty. The results therefore suggest that, as long as the financal shocks are restrcted to north Amerca and Western europe, chna's growth and the mports on whch ts tradng partners rely are unlkely to be hndered sgnficantly.
A key provso s that the financal shocks do not spread beyond north Amerca and Western europe. We regard such a spread as unlkely, so do not consder t here. clearly, f the crss of financal confidence goes global, financal wealth wll dmnsh n all regons, leadng to declnes n consumpton and employment that could take many years to resolve. The potental for global growth remans consderable, however, and t s dfficult to beleve that pessmsm about the future could become so wdespread as to permanently under-prce assets essental to that growth.
Fnally, whle we show that chna's contnued growth mght not depend as closely as had prevously been thought on markets for exports n north Amerca and Western europe, we would do well to remnd ourselves on what that growth must depend. The key s contnued accumulaton and renewal of physcal captal. of course, the transformaton of the labour force nto sklled workers and professonals s also essental but ths occurs n response to wage ncentves that depend on captal accumulaton. Productvty growth s also mportant, but ths depends on captal accumulaton and renewal. so what are the threats to captal accumulaton and renewal n chna? The man one s a rse n poltcal rsk. should the chnese government be destablsed, FdI would be repelled and there would be llegal captal flght. output growth and mports from other regons would slow. The lesson s that contnued chnese growth s not prmarly about export markets. It requres that chna's government s stable and charts a steady and sensble polcy course.
Notes
1 The short-term financal lterature on ths pont s vast: see, for example, Wolf (2007 Wolf ( ), mckbbn and stoekel (2007a Wolf ( , 2007b .
2 more so snce t appears that these financal shocks have caused a speculatve retreat to commodtes, whch has, at least temporarly, shfted the nternatonal terms of trade aganst chna.
3 For evdence supportng the promnence of the components trade n other Asan economes, see Athukorala (2005) .
4 It mght well be consdered to have begun wth the Us tech boom of the 1990s, however, and ts subsequent bust, nonetheless leavng n ts wake contnued strong Us productvty growth, whch retarded domestc nflaton and made the monetary expansons possble; see Pennngs and Tyers (forthcomng) and olner et al. (2008) .
5 The mport surge dd not rase Us unemployment, although low-sklled workers were less favourably affected (Woo and Xao 2007) . 6 see olner et al. (2008) . sgnficantly, they conclude that IT nnovatons were the strongest contrbutor to Us productvty growth n both perods, but mostly before 2000, when the IT producton sectors played key roles. Thereafter, however, whle IT contnued to be mportant, the gans came largely from servces and were bolstered by one-off ndustry restructurng, whch was unlkely to offer sustaned productvty growth n the future.
7 The prces of wheat and ron ore showed extreme behavour n 2007. Although the growth n demand n the economes n transton was supportng the rsng trend n both, the extreme spkes were most lkely caused by speculaton after falls n oecd equty prces. The consequence was to exacerbate the adverse shft n chna's terms of trade. 8 chna's current account surplus n that perod, and ts assocated accumulaton of Us assets, has been the subject of an already large range of lterature. The authors' perspectves on ths are detaled n Tyers and Ban (2007) .
9 The model has ts orgns n GTAP-Dynamic, the standard verson of whch s a dervatve of ts comparatve statc progentor, GTAP (hertel 1997). The dynamcs emboded n the orgnal are descrbed n Ianchovchna and mcdougall (2000) . Tyers et al. (2008) descrbe extensons to these dynamcs, whch emphasse endogenous skll levels. 10 money s not represented explctly, necesstatng our focus on real effects. Although no focus on chna s offered, a smlar applcaton usng a more complete representaton of the global macro-economy s provded by mckbbn and stoekel (2007).
11 Baselne productvty n the agrcultural sectors of developng regons grows more rapdly than that n servces. Ths allows contnued sheddng of labour by agrculture. In the case of chna, Wang and dng (2006) estmated that there were 40 mllon surplus workers n chna's agrcultural sector. Whle underemployment s not explct n our model, the assumpton of hgh labour productvty growth n agrculture mples that agrculture s capable of sheddng labour wthout consequences for ts output, as workers are drawn away by urban captal accumulaton. 12 see Ianchovchna and mcdougall (2000) for detals.
13 For further detals on the mplementaton and calbraton of the nvestment nterest premum, see Tyers and Golley (2008b) .
14 The subdvson between producton workers and professonals and para-professonals accords wth the Internatonal labour organsaton's occupaton-based classficaton and s consstent wth the labour dvson adopted n the GTAP Database; see lu et al. (1998) .
15 chna's skll share s projected to rse through tme whle that n north Amerca remans statc.
The contrast s due to north Amerca's hgher ntal skll share, ts hgh rate of unsklled mmgraton and the hgher fertlty rate of ts low-sklled famles.
16 It grows at a rate that s declnng through tme, manly because low fertlty causes chna's labour force to fall after about a decade; see Tyers and Golley (2008b) .
17 It acts to rase the regon-specfic prce of captal goods, K i P , n equaton 1. Both shocks offer ndrect means of representng events n financal markets n the past year. The rses n nterest premums and the declnes n expected (and ultmately real) returns are due to weakenng optmsm about the future, most partcularly n the Unted states, and therefore declnng asset prces.
18 consumpton/savngs choces by regonal collectve households are adaptve, respondng to changes n real per capta ncomes and real returns on savng. We expermented wth alternatve behavoural assumptons for north Amerca, n one case forcng all the ncome adjustment on savng and n the other on consumpton n that regon. The effects of these dfferences on the global economy were small, so for smplcty we dscuss results only from the model's standard specficaton.
19 Ths s not the case for gross natonal product (GnP), whch does fall n the short run due to the loss of returns from home and foregn-sourced captal ncome n north Amerca and Western europe. In chna, n contrast wth ts GdP, GnP slows (though does not fall absolutely), agan due to the loss of foregn-sourced ncome.
20 The correspondng ncrements to unemployment rates n both regons are much smaller gven ther large shares of professonal labour, the wages of whch reman flexble.
21
The model s not constraned to approach any partcular steady state, although all global captal market mbalances do tend to moderate over three decades n the baselne projecton. 27 Illegal nflows enter through legal loopholes, acqustons n hong kong and macau and va transfer prcng; see Walter and howe (2006) . 28 or, alternatvely, f nflaton s to be controlled t requres a poltcally nexpedent apprecaton of the renmnb.
29 As modelled, these assets are held n a global trust that delvers an average global rate of return. Blateral holdngs are not dentfied. nonetheless, gven the sze of the north Amercan and Western european economes, the financal shocks cause a substantal reducton n the rate of return earned. 30 These real apprecatons stem from the assocated rse n aggregate demand, whch tends to rase the prces of home goods more than comparatvely elastcally suppled foregn goods; see Tyers et al. (2008) .
31 durng 2007, a porton of the PBc's foregn assets was swapped for renmnb-denomnated government debt and placed wth chna's soveregn wealth fund, the cIc. Ths was to reduce the currency msmatch on the PBc's balance sheet, a problem that would be exacerbated by a sudden and substantal fiscal surplus; see Tyers and Ban (2007) .
32 Imports recover, however, to be larger than the baselne n the long run, once the savng rate s restored to ts orgnal declnng path.
